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I. INTRODUCTION
Jeremy Bloom is the defending World Champion in moguls
skiing, representing the United States in this discipline at both the
2002 and 2006 Winter Olympics.1 Bloom also played football for the
University of Colorado from 2002 to 2003 where he established two
Colorado football records.2 Before enrolling at Colorado in 2002,
Bloom had endorsed numerous products and desired to continue doing
so throughout his time in college so that he could fund his skiing
career.
3
The National Collegiate Athletics Association ("NCAA") allows
student-athletes ("athletes" or "student-athletes") to compete
professionally and receive salaries in sports other than those for which
they compete in college. 4 However, it does not allow athletes to
receive endorsements of any kind.5 When Bloom decided to attend the
University of Colorado, the school applied to the NCAA for a waiver of
the prohibition on student-athletes receiving endorsements so that
Bloom could use these endorsements to enable him to pursue his
1. Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Congress 40 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Jeremy
Bloom), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju95802. 00/hju95802
_0f.htm. Bloom finished in ninth and fifth place, respectively, at the 2002 and 2006 Olympics.
2. Id. at 40. Bloom is the all-time freshman leader at Colorado in punt return yardage and
punt returns for touchdowns; he also led Colorado in punt return yardage in both his freshman
and sophomore season and kickoff return yardage in his sophomore season. 2004 COLORADO
FOOTBALL MEDIA GUIDE 164-65 (July 2004), available at http://www.cubuffs.com/pdf2
/6976.pdf?SPSID=3860&SPID=255&DBOEM_ID=600.
3. Hearing, supra note 1, at 41-42 (statement of Jeremy Bloom). Bloom's expenses for
coaching (often full-time) and training amounted to an estimated $100,000 a year. Paul Woody,
At NCAA, Good People Made a Bad Call on Players' Eligibility, THE RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Sept. 5, 2004, at C-4.
4. 2005-2006 NCAA DISION I MANUAL art. 12.1.2 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (2005)
(stating that professional athletes in one sport are eligible in other NCAA sports but can not
receive athletic aid if under contract and receiving compensation for the professional sport).
5. Id. art. 12.5.2.1 (stating that student-athletes will be ineligible if, subsequent to their
enrollment in college, they accept compensation for promoting commercial products through
their names, faces, or use of the product).
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skiing career while playing college football. However, the NCAA
refused this request.6 Bloom sought relief from the Colorado state
court system where a trial court ruled against his request for a
preliminary injunction in 2002.7 After relinquishing his endorsements
for two years so that he could play college football, Bloom accepted an
endorsement deal in March of 2004 because, in his words, "I was
certain that with the Olympic Games looming only 2 years away that I
could not afford to continue in this manner and have a chance to
achieve my objective of winning an Olympic Gold Medal for my
country in 2006."8
After accepting these endorsements in violation of NCAA
policy, Bloom's only hope of continuing his collegiate football career, in
the absence of a softened stance by the NCAA, lay in his pending
appeal. A Colorado appellate court, however, affirmed the lower
court's denial of the preliminary injunction. 9 Nonetheless, the court
held that Bloom had standing to sue the NCAA as a third-party
beneficiary to the contract between the NCAA and its member
schools. 10  Although previous cases had indicated that student-
athletes might be third-party beneficiaries, this decision marked the
first time that a court acknowledged unequivocally that student-
athletes have contract rights under the NCAA Constitution and
Bylaws ("NCAA Constitution" or "Constitution").11  In granting
student-athletes standing to sue the NCAA, the Colorado court of
appeals implicitly recognized that the interests of universities, the
NCAA, and student-athletes are often misaligned as a result of the
pervasive commercialism in big-time college sports.
The NCAA enumerates many responsibilities that universities
must observe in their dealings with student-athletes. Among the most
important of these duties are the dual responsibilities of providing for
student-athlete welfare (which includes protecting the health of
athletes and providing them with a safe environment)12 and setting
sound academic standards for student-athletes. 13 If considered third-
party beneficiaries to the contract between the NCAA and its member
6. Hearing, supra note 1, at 41 (statement of Jeremy Bloom).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 42.
9. Bloom v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 93 P.3d 621, 628 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
10. Id. at 624.
11. The Constitution, Operating Bylaws, and Administrative Bylaws are parts of the NCAA
Division I Manual but will all be referred to as "Constitution" or "NCAA Constitution" for
simplicity.
12. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 2.2.3 (adopted in 1995).
13. Id. art. 2.5.
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universities, student-athletes would be able to seek injunctive relief to
enforce these contractual responsibilities 14 and sue for money damages
for foreseeable losses.15 Before Bloom, courts analyzed most suits
brought by athletes using a highly deferential standard of review that
seemingly gave the NCAA unfettered discretion. However, due to the
dearth of cases involving the NCAA and the consequent nationwide
importance of each case, the Bloom court's ruling may signal a change
in the way that courts will view NCAA actions that directly affect
student-athletes. After Bloom, for example, student-athletes may be
able to bring previously unavailable claims against the NCAA as a
result of the Bloom court's third-party beneficiary determination.
This Note argues that the Bloom court's decision recognizes the
unequal relationship between big-time NCAA student-athletes, 16 their
institutions, and the NCAA by allowing student-athletes to bring their
own claims based on the contract rights given to them by the NCAA
Constitution. Part II of this Note includes a brief description of the
NCAA and details the staggering amount of money generated by
Division I basketball and football. Part III analyzes the deferential
standard of judicial review traditionally applied to the actions of the
NCAA and the difficulties that student-athletes faced when suing the
NCAA prior to the Bloom decision. This Part also describes the
problems associated with giving the NCAA deference when its actions
affect student-athletes.
Part IV discusses cases brought against NCAA member schools
based on contract law theories before Bloom. In these cases, student-
athletes succeeded initially by arguing that athletic scholarships
constituted employment contracts. Courts, however, eventually
rejected this reasoning as the NCAA changed its legal strategy. While
modern courts recognize the contractual relationship between student-
athletes and their universities, they still require claimants to show a
breach of an implied duty, which is difficult to prove.
Part V examines the Bloom case in relation to existing
association law and contract principles. Focusing on the implications
going forward, this Part considers the impact of the Colorado court's
decision to confer standing on Bloom as a third-party beneficiary to
the NCAA Constitution in light of the rights this contract gives
14. 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:6 at 25 (4th ed. 2000).
15. Id. § 37:12 (noting that "creditor beneficiaries" can recover compensation for the value of
the promised performance and any other injury that the promisor could have foreseen at the
time of the contract).
16. For the purposes of this Note, the term "big-time" NCAA sports means those NCAA
Division I basketball and football programs that generate large amounts of revenue.
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student-athletes. This Note argues that other courts should follow the
approach taken by the court in Bloom, and if they do, student-athletes
may be able to fashion successful contract claims when institutions
breach promises to provide for student-athlete health and academic
welfare.
II. THE MODERN NCAA
The NCAA has changed dramatically since 1906 when it was
founded for the purpose of establishing safety standards for the game
of football.1 7 While the NCAA still puts a priority on the safety and
amateurism of its athletes, basketball and football at the Division I
level have become more and more commercial. The increasing amount
of money spent on these sports highlights the tension between the
welfare and amateurism provisions in the NCAA Constitution and the
commercial reality of big-time NCAA sports.
A. NCAA Structure and Enforcement Procedures
Currently, 1,273 institutions belong to the NCAA in three
separate divisions.1 ' This Note focuses primarily on the 326
institutions belonging to NCAA Division I whose member schools are
required to grant certain minimum financial awards in the form of
athletic scholarships. 19 This differs from Division II, where most
athletes receive athletic scholarships combined with other types of aid
in order to pay for schooling, and Division III, where athletes do not
receive athletic scholarships. 20
The NCAA and its member institutions signify their contract
with one another through the NCAA Constitution. The Constitution
sets forth the basic purposes and fundamental policies for the
association.21  Various provisions of the Constitution reflect the
17. Steven Rock, System Puts Players at Risk, NCAA Doesn't Require Medical Supervision,
KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 7, 1997, at Al (detailing the deaths and injuries resulting from the
football play called the "flying wedge" that eventually led President Theodore Roosevelt to order
colleges to join together to make sports safer).
18. Composition of the NCAA, http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membership-svcs/
membership_breakdown.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Composition of the NCAA].
Division I is further split up into I-A and I-AA for football; I-A being the more elaborate division,
with requirements on game attendance and conference participation. NCAA Division I, II and III
Membership Criteria, http://www.ncaa.orglaboutldivcriteria. html (last visited Apr. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter NCAA Division I, II and III Membership Criteria].
19. Composition of the NCAA, supra note 18; NCAA Division I, Il and III Membership
Criteria, supra note 18.
20. NCAA Division I, II and III Membership Criteria, supra note 18.
21. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 5.2.1.
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association's interest in both the welfare of the student-athlete and
the principle of amateurism. In its attempt to establish the primacy of
its amateur ideals, the NCAA sets forth that its first association-wide
purpose is "[t]o initiate, stimulate and improve intercollegiate
athletics programs for student-athletes and to promote and develop
educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence and
athletics participation as a recreational pursuit."22 Thus, it intends to
make the athletic programs of member institutions a part of the
educational program in order to maintain a difference between
intercollegiate and professional sports.23  Theoretically, athletes
should participate in NCAA sports because of their educational
motivations as well as the "physical, mental and social benefits to be
derived" from participation in these sports.24
Each NCAA division adopts its own operating bylaws, which
provide rules and regulations consistent with the NCAA Constitution
and relate to the administration of the division and its championships,
the delegation of authority, and the procedures for enforcing the
provisions of the Constitution.25 The amateurism provision in the
Division I bylaws prohibits pay for various types of athletic
performance in excess of necessary expenses. 26 This same provision,
allows a professional athlete in one sport to represent a member
institution in a different sport. 27 Student-athletes are not, however,
eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics if they receive
endorsements of any kind, even if for a non-NCAA sport. 28
The NCAA investigates possible infractions when reasonable
cause exists to believe that a member institution has violated its
obligations under the NCAA Constitution. The NCAA initiates such
inquiries on its own but also encourages universities to self-disclose
infractions by considering this a "mitigating factor in determining the
penalty" to be levied against a school that violates an NCAA
provision. 29 Inquiries involving student-athlete eligibility thus take a
different form if the university promptly discloses the ineligibility.
Instead of appearing before the Committee on Infractions, as it would
22. Id. art. 1.2(a).
23. Id. art. 1.3.1.
24. Id. art. 2.9.
25. Id. art. 5.2.2.
26. Id. art. 12.1.1.1.
27. See id. arts. 12.01.1 (only amateur athletes are eligible to participate in intercollegiate
athletics), 12.1.2 (limiting the ability of professional athletes in one sport to represent their
colleges in other sports). The bylaw most relevant to Bloom's case is 12.1.2.
28. Id. art. 12.5.2.1.
29. Id. art. 32.2.1.2.
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if it had allowed the ineligible player to continue to participate in his
or her respective sport, the university may declare such a student-
athlete ineligible and seek a restoration of eligibility through the
Committee on Student Athlete Reinstatement. 30 As in all proceedings
before an NCAA committee, a representative of the member
institution represents the student-athlete in front of this committee. 31
B. Mass Commercialism in Division I Basketball and Football
While the NCAA posits that the furtherance of amateurism in
college sports is its goal, the current state of affairs in the big-money
sports reflects a pervasive commercialism. For example, CBS is in the
middle of a $6.2 billion, eleven-year contract with the NCAA to
televise the NCAA Division I Men's Basketball Tournament. When
coupled with other sources of Tournament revenue, this sum amounts
to over 90 percent of the NCAA's operating budget. 32 In addition, each
football team invited to play in a Bowl Championship Series (BCS)
bowl (the most prestigious post-season games in college football)
earned more than $14.5 million for its conference in 2005. 3 Even with
these staggering figures, however, the NCAA enjoys tax-exempt status
because it is a non-profit organization. 34
Division I basketball and football players have a substantial
impact on the financial well-being of the schools they represent both
directly, through ticket sales and direct contracts, and indirectly,
through increased institutional giving and exposure. Experience has
shown that donations and applications to universities increase
dramatically in the immediate aftermath of basketball and football
30. Id. art. 14.11.1.
31. Id. art. 14.12.2.
32. KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A CALL TO ACTION:
RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION 19 (2001). College football does not
contribute to these NCAA revenues because conferences negotiate their own television contracts
for football and distribute these funds among member schools. See id. at 20 (noting that only
conference commissioners and representatives of the television networks negotiate the BCS
television contract and that university presidents have little control over the distribution of
Division I-A postseason football revenues).
33. Bowl Championship Series Revenue Distribution, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
index.cfm?page=revenue (last visited Apr. 30, 2006). The institutions with teams in bowls do not
receive the money directly as it goes to their conferences and is normally divided on a pro rata
basis. See Cary Dohman, Rose Bowl or Not, Badgers Still Cash in, THE DAILY CARDINAL (Dec. 3,
2004), available at http://www.dailycardinal.com/article.php?storyid=820646 (last visited Apr.
30, 2006) (describing the University of Wisconsin's bowl share from the Big Ten in 2004-05).
34. Worldwide Basketball and Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 273 F. Supp.
2d 933, 936 (S.D. Ohio 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 388 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2004).
2006] 911
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success. 35  While the debate over the so-called "Flutie Factor 36
continues, commentators agree that athletic success breeds a higher
profile for a university, which, in turn, gives the institution greater
exposure. 37 With this monetary impact, the temptation to exploit big-
time athletes may affect the actions of university staff and coaches.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE JUDICIAL DECISION NOT TO INTERFERE WITH
THE NCAA
In 1988, The Supreme Court held that the NCAA is not a state
actor because the hundreds of institutions that affect NCAA policy do
not reside in the same state or act under the color of any one state's
laws. 38 Therefore, NCAA action amounts to private conduct and
courts will not apply the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause to actions undertaken by the NCAA. 39 Rather, courts have
largely deferred to NCAA action in cases brought by plaintiffs. As a
result, student-athletes have met with little success in bringing claims
against the NCAA. Applying this deference to decisions involving
student-athletes is problematic, however, both because student-
athletes have little choice in joining the NCAA and because the
amount of money at stake in big-time NCAA sports calls into question
whether university officials really act in these student-athletes' best
interests.
35. See J. Brad Reich, All the [Athletes] are Equal, But Some are More Equal Than Others:
An Objective Evaluation of Title IX's Past, Present, and Recommendations for its Future, 108
PENN ST. L. REV 525, 554 (2003) (noting the precipitous rise in donations and applications at
Gonzaga University after the success of its basketball team in the NCAA tournament).
36. See Christopher M. Parent, Personal Fouls, How Sexual Assault by Football Players is
Exposing Universities to Title IX Liability, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 617,
621-22 (2003) (discussing the significant rise in the number of applicants at Boston College in
the immediate aftermath of the football team's success, led by quarterback Doug Flutie, which
spawned the term describing this phenomenon at other schools).
37. See ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETICS FOR HIRE: THE
EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA'S AMATEUR MYTH 89 (1998) (arguing that this public
relations function is an important reason athletes are recruited); Reich, supra note 35, at 554
(detailing the statements of a Vice President at Xavier University who said that while the
success of the basketball team does not win students, it may bring about the exposure that first
interests prospective students).
38. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988).
39. Id. at 191, 199 (holding that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not apply
to private conduct and because the NCAA's conduct cannot be fairly attributable to any one
state, it amounts to such private conduct).
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A. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review and the NCAA
Because the NCAA is a voluntary athletic association, courts
have been reluctant to intervene in its internal affairs.40 Despite this
reluctance, courts will interfere when the association's actions
threaten members' private rights (including property or pecuniary
rights).41 When no economic interest is at stake, though, courts are
divided as to whether they may scrutinize the actions of an
association. 42 The majority of courts, however, allow for arbitrary and
capricious review of an association's actions even if these actions do
not affect a property interest.43 Finally, courts generally find that the
constitution and bylaws of an association constitute a contract
between the members and the association. 44
Despite the fact that the arbitrary and capricious standard is
very deferential to associations, some courts apply an even more
lenient standard when reviewing the NCAA's actions. For example, in
Phillip v. Fairfield University, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the NCAA's refusal to grant a waiver of an eligibility
requirement for a freshman basketball player was not enough to
40. See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that courts are
reluctant to intervene except on limited grounds in the affairs of voluntary associations); 6 AM.
JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 8 (recognizing an association's right to administer its own rules
without judicial intervention).
41. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 29 (2004); NAACP v. Golding, 679 A.2d 554, 562
(Md. 1996).
42. Some courts have held that the actions of certain voluntary associations, because their
rulings constitute state action, are subject to review if these actions are arbitrary and capricious
but that purely private associations should not be held to this standard. See Indiana High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 231 (Ind. 1997) (holding that because the actions
of a state high school athletic association are similar to those of a government agency, the same
standard should be applied); Plummer v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 97 F.3d 220,
227-28 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that disciplinary actions taken by a voluntary accounting
association would not be held to the arbitrary and capricious standard because the association is
private).
43. See NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Ky. 2001) (stating that relief from the judicial
system is forthcoming when a voluntary athletic association acts arbitrarily or capriciously
toward student-athletes); Peoria Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Accrediting Council for Continuing Educ.
and Training, 805 F. Supp. 579, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (stating the "common-law principle" that
federal review of the actions of a voluntary association is limited to whether such decisions are
"arbitrary and unreasonable"); N.A.A.C.P. v. Golding, 679 A.2d 554, 563 (Md. Ct. App. 1996)
(declining to interfere with an association's decision because it was not, among other things,
arbitrary); Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979) (sanctioning judicial
review of association action that is fraudulent, collusive, arbitrary, or contravening to public
policy); 6 AM. JUR. 2D Associations and Clubs § 8 (stating that the rules and by-laws of a
voluntary association should not be subject to judicial interference unless their enforcement
would be, among other things, arbitrary and capricious).
44. See Straub v. Am. Bowling Cong., 353 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Neb. 1984) (stating that the rules
and by-laws of a voluntary bowling association constituted a contract among the members).
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constitute a breach of the NCAA's duty to treat the plaintiff fairly and
in good faith even though there was evidence suggesting that the
action was arbitrary. 45 The court held that the NCAA must exhibit
some bad faith, through a bad motive or dishonest purpose, in order
for the court to invalidate the NCAA action. 46 This high burden
requires a showing of intent and is not consistent with the majority of
association cases47 which hold that courts may interfere with an
organization's rules and by-laws when their enforcement would be
arbitrary and capricious.
In cases against other athletic associations, student-athletes
have argued that the associations in question interpreted rules
differently than these associations had in the past. Under the
traditional deferential standard of review, student-athletes have used
such arguments to show that the association acted arbitrarily. For
instance, in Manuel v. Oklahoma City University, the trial court
determined that the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics' 48
interpretation of an eligibility rule was arbitrary because the
interpretation was counter to the rule's plain language and counter to
its past interpretations in "hundreds" of cases. 49
B. Student-Athletes Have Little Choice in Deciding to Join the NCAA
The deferential standard of review stated above springs from
the notion that associations and their voluntary members have a First
Amendment right to associate, which should not be burdened by
courts.50 At least one court, however, has held that this principle
should not apply when a college athlete brings suit against an athletic
association since student-athletes have little choice but to join the
association. 51 This court asserted, "The athlete himself has no voice or
bargaining power concerning the rules and regulations.., because he
is not a member, yet he stands to be substantially affected, and even
damaged, by an association ruling declaring him to be ineligible to
participate in intercollegiate athletics."52 Another court followed this
45. 118 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1997).
46. Id.
47. See supra note 43.
48. The NAIA exists apart from the NCAA and sanctions athletic events among various
colleges and universities throughout the country.
49. 833 P.2d 288, 292-93 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
50. See supra note 40.
51. Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979).
52. Id. In addition, Congressman Spencer Bacchus (R-AL) has questioned the validity of
calling the NCAA a voluntary association because athletes are most affected by NCAA decisions
914 [Vol. 59:3:905
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reasoning with regard to high school athletes and their relationship to
state high school athletic associations. 53
C. Officials Face Conflicts in Their Treatment of Student-Athletes
Another problem facing big-time student-athletes stems from
the fact that university officials who make decisions regarding the
welfare of these athletes (coaches, athletic directors, faculty members,
or high level officials) face inherent conflicts of interest. Conflicts of
interest often exist within a corporate board of directors, and for this
reason, commentators have compared the deferential standard of
review applicable to associations to the deferential business judgment
rule applicable to actions taken by such boards. 54 The business
judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision,
the directors of a corporation "acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company."55 If the challenger does not establish facts
which rebut the presumption, the court will respect the corporation's
judgment. 56  Alleging facts that create a reasonable doubt as to
whether directors are disinterested and independent suffices to rebut
the business judgment rule and causes a court to invoke the tougher,
entire fairness standard. 57
In a famous case involving conflicted board members, In re The
Limited, the Delaware Chancery Court held that a decision made by
the Limited's board that financially benefited the family trust of the
controlling shareholder was conflicted.58  Because the controlling
shareholder had the power to remove any director, the court found
that there was a reasonable doubt whether those directors with large
and they have no voice in the rulemaking. Hearing, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of Spencer
Bacchus).
53. E.g., Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 230 (Ind. 1997).
Even though the court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to an eligibility
decision of a high school athletic association, the court found that high school athletes do not
voluntarily subject themselves to the association's rules.
54. See NAACP v. Golding, 679 A.2d 554, 561 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the rule limiting
judicial intervention in unincorporated organizations analogous to the business judgment rule).
55. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 814 (holding that a plaintiff shows demand futility by creating a reasonable
doubt that the directors are disinterested and independent which, in turn, raises a reasonable
doubt that the business judgment rule should apply). Winning at the demand futility level allows
a plaintiff to have the merits of the case heard, and losing at the demand level effectively ends
the suit. In re The Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2002 WL 537692, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002).
58. Id. at *3,*4. The board rescinded a stock buyback option that would have had a negative
financial effect on the family trust of the CEO/controlling shareholder.
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financial stakes in the corporation had ignored their duty to act in the
corporation's best interests in favor of acting in the controlling
shareholder's best interest. 59 As a result, the court analyzed the
transaction under a more exacting fairness review and determined
that the board's decision appeared unfair to the stockholders. 60
Similar to the facts of In re The Limited, the staggering sums of
money at stake in Division I basketball and football may shift the
priorities of university officials from acting in the best interests of
student-athletes to acting in the best financial interests of their
respective schools. In choosing to admit incoming student-athletes,
universities are likely to dismiss the "student first, athlete second"
precept given the involvement of coaches with multi-million dollar
contracts and university officials who "balance under-capitalized
accounts." 61 Just as actors in a corporation (the board of directors)
must act solely in the best interests of the corporation, university
actors (i.e. the board of trustees, faculty, and staff) must prioritize the
education and welfare of students. Yet, the conflict of interest created
by the large financial impact that athletes have on their institutions
weakens the school's presumed good-faith in its dealings with
athletes. 62
An anecdote is helpful to illustrate the large financial impact
that a single student-athlete can have on an institution's financial
well-being. In its final regular football game of the 1996 season
against the University of Southern California ("USC"), Notre Dame's
placekicker missed an extra point at the end of regulation that sent
the game into overtime. In overtime, USC won the game 27-21.63
That missed extra point "cost" Notre Dame $8 million when its
football team did not get the bowl invitation it would have received
had the team won. 64 With this level of compensation at stake,65 the
pressure to win is high among the Notre Dame trustees, athletic
59. See id. at *7 (finding that the allegations raised disqualifying doubts about the
directors' independence). The Aronson court similarly held that in the demand futility analysis,
which leads to entire fairness review if proven, directors who are under an influence that
sterilizes their discretion are not proper persons to bring derivative litigation against the
corporation. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
60. See In re The Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2002 WL 537692, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27,
2002) (finding that the plaintiffs stated a breach of loyalty claim that survived a 12(b)(6) motion
and would thus go to trial).
61. Derek Quinn Johnson, Note, Educating Misguided Student-Athletes: An Application of
Contract Theory, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 96, 107 (1985).
62. Id.
63. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS 3 (1999).
64. Id.
65. Notre Dame is not forced to give any TV or bowl money from football to a conference as
it does not belong to a football conference.
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department staff, and football coaches 66 and could prompt these
officials to act contrary to a student-athlete's best interests.
While these facts concern only one particular institution, the
amount of money available to many Division I basketball and football
programs suggests a mismatch between the welfare interests of
student-athletes and those of the universities they represent. 67
Consequently, this Note argues that courts should analyze under a
stricter standard those claims brought by athletes who allege a failure
to value the athletes' welfare over their athletic contributions. This
standard of review is similar to that used by courts to review
corporate conflicts. Basketball and football players at big-time
Division I programs could argue that their performances generate the
requisite indirect and direct revenues to create these conflicts of
interest. They would, however, need to show that the alleged harmful
actions sprang directly from the conflict between the university's
financial welfare and the welfare of the athlete. These mismatched
interests not only relate to review of the substantive merits of a
student-athlete's claim, but also to the student-athlete's ability to
bring a case against the NCAA independent of the institution.68
IV. CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS AND STUDENT-ATHLETES BEFORE BLOOM
In bringing suit against the universities they represent,
scholarship athletes have attempted to move courts to a more exacting
standard of review by alleging a deprivation of property or financial
interests. Over the last forty years, courts have acknowledged that
the relationship between athletes and their institutions is contractual
in nature and that property interests are at stake. However, these
same courts have failed to provide a unified approach with regard to
the nature of this relationship and the precise contractual duties that
flow from it. This inconsistency, due to a lack of discernable standards
by which to measure the NCAA, foreshadows the import of the Bloom
decision going forward.
66. Notre Dame's Board of Trustees and athletic department came under tremendous
media scrutiny in December 2004 when they fired head football coach Tyrone Willingham after
only three seasons. In Willingham's three seasons, Notre Dame was a mediocre 21-15 and did not
win a bowl game. AD Cites Lack of On-Field Progress, ESPN.com, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncflnews/story?id=1935138 (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
67. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
68. While the Bloom court, in granting standing to student-athletes to bring suit, did not
identify commercial concerns as a reason for this holding, the fact that the interests of big-time
athletes and institutions can be so different affirms the standing decision.
20061 917
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
A. Contractual Nature of the Student/Institution Relationship
The relationship between a non-athlete student and that
student's college is contractual. 69  Courts have held that this
contractual relationship imposes certain duties on both the school and
its students and that these duties are judicially enforceable. 70
Institutions must provide students with an atmosphere conducive to
learning, 71 must not enter into agreements with students that would
be unconscionable, 72 and must award a degree upon completion of the
student's course of study73 among other duties. These duties show
that contractual claims are available to even non-athlete students and
that courts thus seek to protect students in their relationships with
institutions of higher learning.
B. Workmen's Compensation Cases
One of the first cases addressing whether a contractual
relationship existed between an athlete and the athlete's institution
was Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Commission.74 In this case, Van
Horn, a scholarship football player for California State Polytechnic
College, died in a plane crash on his way home from a football game in
Ohio. 75  Van Horn's family instituted a suit against the state
industrial commission, alleging that their son was an employee and
that they were entitled to workmen's compensation. 76 The court found
for Van Horn's family, holding that Van Horn received compensation
(the scholarship) for services rendered (his athletic prowess) and this
contract made him an employee of the college.77 Therefore, the
commission was required to pay workmen's compensation to the
69. Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 398, 398-99 (Colo. 1994) (reasoning that an
educational institution may augment the agreement between the institution and a student by
providing materials, such as catalogs and student handbooks, to the student).
70. Brody v. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences, 698 N.E.2d 257, 265 (Il1. App. Ct. 1998).
71. Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 402 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
72. Albert Merrill Sch. v. Godoy, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974).
73. Sharick v. Southeastern Univ. of Health Scis., 780 So.2d 136, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
74. 33 Cal Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
75. Id. at 170.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 174 (holding that the state's workmen's compensation law should be liberally
construed to effect its beneficent purposes).
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family. This case suggested, for the first time that scholarship
athletes were employees of their member institutions. 78
As a result of this landmark decision, the NCAA took
seemingly contradictory steps over the next twenty years to
distinguish athletic scholarships from employment contracts. 79 In
court, the NCAA asserted that receipt of an athletic scholarship did
not hinge on the athlete's continued participation in the activity.80
However, behind closed doors, the NCAA enacted provisions that
would allow a school to cancel an athlete's institutional aid for a lack
of participation or for a refusal to follow the directions of athletic
staff.
8 1
The NCAA's strategy of differentiating scholarships from
employment contracts gained traction in Coleman v. Western
Michigan University when a Michigan court of appeals held that a
student-athlete is not an employee due to the fact that sports are not
integral to a university's "business."8 2 The court further found that
the athlete's scholarship did not constitute a wage, and it asserted
that the university had only limited ability to "fire" the student-
athlete; thus, the university had no more control over athletes than it
had over normal students.8 3 As indicated by Coleman and other
cases, 4 courts in the future are not likely to consider scholarship
athletes employees of their member institutions.
These courts' assumptions as to the role of college sports in a
university's business are questionable when considered within the
landscape of big-time Division I sports. Many of these sports bring in
considerable amounts of money for the member institutions, and so
the insinuation that athletics are not a part of the business of these
78. The court made clear that while it did not consider scholarship athletes employees as a
matter of law, where the evidence established a contract of employment the inference could be
reasonably drawn. Id. at 175.
79. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 37, at 81 (noting that in the aftermath of Van
Horn, the NCAA urged its member institutions to review and reword their grant-in-aid policies
so that this language did not suggest an employment relationship).
80. Id. at 81-82. The NCAA did this by simply inserting language in the grant-in-aid
materials that asserted that the scholarship "did not constitute payment or compensation for
participation." Id. at 82. If an athlete could get out of his athletic commitment so freely, courts
would be less likely to find that the athlete had a performance obligation and that, because of
this, the scholarship was not a contract for services.
81. Id. at 84. This seems hypocritical in light of the NCAA's previous assertion that
student-athletes could escape their athletic commitments and keep receiving scholarship funds.
82. 336 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
83. Id. at 226-27.
84. See Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983)
(reversing a lower court holding that an Indiana State football player was an employee of the
university).
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universities is counterfactual. These early judicial decisions do not
affect modern student-athletes who desire to bring claims against the
NCAA or their member institutions though. The rights granted by
workmen's compensation statutes are not as substantial as contract
remedies; normal contract claims are much more valuable to the
aggrieved student-athlete.
C. Other Contract Cases Pre-Bloom: The Difficulty of Proving Breach
of the Implied Duty of Good Faith
While courts no longer equate scholarship agreements with
employment contracts, the signing of the scholarship agreement and
National Letter of Intent ("NLI") does signify the contractual
mechanisms of offer and acceptance.85 Even though courts do not
consider these documents to be employment contracts, courts have
accepted the contractual nature of this relationship.8 6 Through the
NLI, athletes agree to offer their athletic talents for the sole benefit of
the universities that they will attend and universities agree to provide
financial assistance as consideration in the scholarship agreement.8 7
Despite judicial recognition of this contractual relationship,
athletes have had difficulty proving breaches of these athletic
contracts. In a case involving a scholarship basketball player who
brought a breach of contract claim against his university for failing to
provide the academic support that the university's athletic
department had promised, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit concluded that such an action could only be maintained for a
breach of specific promises.88 In this case, the court noted that it
would not allow the student-athlete, Ross, to repackage his
educational malpractice claim against Creighton University as a
breach of contract claim by making a general attack on the quality of
education.8 9 Earlier in the decision, the court, citing policy and
practical concerns, refused to recognize the tort of educational
85. See Mark R. Whitmore, Denying Scholarship Athletes Workers' Compensation: Do
Courts Punt Away a Statutory Right?, 76 IOwA L. REV. 763, 787-89 (1991) (identifying the
elements of contract formation and enforcement between scholarship athletes and universities).
86. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ct. App. NC 1972) (holding
that an eligible scholarship athlete's refusal to play on the university football team constituted a
breach of his contractual obligations); Ross v. Creighton Univ. 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (finding that the contractual relationship surely applied to Ross who was providing
athletic services in exchange for tuition and expenses).
87. See Whitmore, supra note 85, at 787-88 (stating that all the elements of contract
formation exist in the scholarship agreement).
88. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1991).
89. Id.
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malpractice arising from Creighton's alleged failure to educate Ross. 90
The court explained that a petitioning student-athlete must "point to
an identifiable contractual promise that the defendant failed to honor"
in order to state a cognizable contractual claim. 91 The Seventh Circuit
held that Ross's allegations that the university had not lived up to its
promise to provide him specific services so as to allow him to
participate academically were sufficient to state such a claim.92
Some courts have stated that the only contractual duty owed by
institutions and the NCAA to athletes or prospective athletes is the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.93 In Hall v. NCAA, a federal
district court held that the NCAA did not violate the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing implicit in its contract with Hall. 94 After a
dispute over an NCAA core course requirement, Hall, an incoming
scholarship basketball player at Bradley University, sued to enjoin the
NCAA from declaring him ineligible, alleging that the NCAA had
breached its contract with him.95 The court found contractual intent
through Hall's offer of application and payment to the NCAA
Clearinghouse (the organization that determines student-athlete
eligibility for the NCAA) and the Clearinghouse's acceptance of his
application, but held that the NCAA did not breach this contract
because it applied its standards fairly to Hall.96
The court then assumed for the purposes of its argument that
Hall was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the NCAA
and its member schools. 97 The court's decision to consider athletes the
intended beneficiaries arose from the perceived role of "gatekeeper"
that the court found the NCAA plays in determining athlete
eligibility.98 Concluding that Hall was unable to show that the NCAA
failed to perform a material contractual obligation due to its mere
90. Id. at 415 (citing the lack of a standard of care, concerns with proving proximate cause
and damages, and the possibility of a flood of litigation as the main reasons for their decision not
to recognize this tort).
91. Id. at 417.
92. Id. Creighton had promised to provide Ross, "'an opportunity to obtain a meaningful
college education and degree"' and Ross alleged that Creighton's failure to provide adequate
tutoring had deprived him of this opportunity to obtain a meaningful education. Id. at 412.
93. Phillip v. Fairfield Univ., 118 F.3d 131, 135 (2nd Cir. 1997).
94. 985 F. Supp. 782, 795 (E.D. Ill. 1997).
95. Id. at 794.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 797 (granting third-party beneficiary status while expressing skepticism over
whether student-athletes are the intended beneficiaries of the NCAA contract).
98. See id. (contrasting this case to Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320
(9th Cir. 1996), where athletes were not held to be the intended beneficiaries to the contract
between a conference and its schools).
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enforcement of its own rules, the court held that there was no breach
of contract. 99
Even though athletes have convinced courts to recognize
scholarships as contracts, courts have only implied vague obligations
of good faith and fair dealing because the NLI does not impose any
specific obligations on the NCAA or its member institutions.
Therefore, in the absence of express material obligations, courts have
held that an athlete must prove that the NCAA or its member
institution made promises that it did not keep in order to show a
breach of the scholarship agreement. With this scheme in place,
institutions seem unlikely to make extraneous promises to athletes (as
Creighton did in Ross), because without such promises, institutions
will have fewer obligations to the student-athlete.
V. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY STATUS COMES TO FRUITION IN BLOOM
The lessons taught by Bloom v. NCAA may allow student
athletes to more easily fashion successful claims against the NCAA
and its member institutions. Bloom might have been able to prevail
even under the strict association law standard of review had the court
looked at the NCAA's past eligibility ruling involving an athlete in a
similar situation. Moreover, even though Bloom lost his appeal, his
case is important because student-athletes may now have standing to
sue the NCAA as third-party beneficiaries and can point to material
obligations that the university and the NCAA must provide to all
student-athletes. These obligations may be tough to prove, but the
mere availability of such claims against the NCAA improves a
student-athlete's chance of success in court.
A. The Bloom Holding
In Bloom v. NCAA, the Colorado Court of Appeals recognized
that student-athletes have standing to sue the NCAA because they are
third-party beneficiaries to the contract between the NCAA and
member institutions.100 Specifically, the court held that the trial court
had not abused its discretion by refusing to enjoin the NCAA from
barring Bloom's participation in intercollegiate athletics while he
received endorsements related to professional freestyle skiing. 101
Bloom argued that these endorsement deals were the "customary"
method of compensation in freestyle skiing and that because the
99. Id.
100. 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
101. Id. at 627.
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NCAA allows professional athletes to represent member institutions
in other sports, he should be entitled to earn this "income."10 2 In
construing the contract, the court viewed the contract in its entirety,
not in isolated portions, to determine the intent and "reasonable
expectations" of the parties. 103 The court explained that the NCAA
Bylaws evidenced an unambiguous intent to prohibit athletes from
obtaining endorsement deals even though athletes are free to receive
professional salaries in sports not played at the NCAA level.104
Further, it found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
strictly applying the endorsement rules to Bloom because of the
rational relationship between these rules and the NCAA's interest in
distinguishing amateur from professional sports.10 5
More important to the future of student-athlete claims against
the NCAA, the court in Bloom found "that the NCAA's Constitution,
Bylaws, and Regulations evidence a clear intent to benefit student-
athletes."'106 Even though student-athletes are not parties to the
NCAA contract, the court determined that Bloom had standing as a
third-party beneficiary to the contract because the parties to the
agreement 10 7 intended to benefit athletes directly through the
contract. 08 After making this momentous decision, the court turned
once again to the contractual analysis from previous cases and found
that Bloom could not prove a violation of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing implicit in the NCAA contract. 0 9
B. Bloom under Existing Association Law
The Bloom court did not consider an NCAA eligibility ruling
involving an athlete in a situation almost identical to Bloom's. If it
had taken this decision into consideration, Bloom may have won his
appeal even under the deferential association law standard of review.
Bloom's attorney attempted to submit supplemental authority to the
appeals court detailing the treatment of Tim Dwight, 1 0 but because
the trial court had no opportunity to review it, the appeals court
102. Id. at 625.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 626.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 623-24.
107. Here, the NCAA and Colorado University.
108. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623-24.
109. Id. at 624.
110. Dwight recently finished his first year with the New England Patriots.
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refused to consider it.111 Tim Dwight, a track and football star at the
University of Iowa, entered the National Football League ("NFL")
after his junior year and played a full season in the NFL while
receiving endorsements. 1 2 Dwight subsequently petitioned the NCAA
for reinstatement in 1999 to run track in his last year of college
eligibility at Iowa, and the NCAA granted this petition.113 An NCAA
representative told a Colorado compliance officer before Bloom's trial
in 2002 that Dwight had not willfully accepted endorsement money
while a college athlete and had returned any such money received. 11 4
However, Dwight sent Bloom's lawyer an affidavit just before the
appellate oral argument in 2004 claiming that Dwight's receipt of
endorsement money had been willful and produced documentation
showing that the NCAA had not asked him to return the money.11 5
Bloom, through Colorado University, sought reinstatement
from the NCAA Student-Athlete Reinstatement Committee after he
lost in the appeals court.116 The staff reviewed the request, as it
reviews all others by looking at "precedent with similar facts to
determine what conditions for reinstatement should be imposed, if
any."" 7  The NCAA ruled against Bloom's reinstatement request" 8
and his subsequent reinstatement appeal due to the "multiple and
willful violations of NCAA rules regarding endorsements."'"19 Even
with the knowledge of the signed affidavit that Dwight had sent
Bloom's lawyer, the director of student-athlete reinstatement for the
NCAA pointed to Bloom's "willful" violation as the sole substantive
difference between the reinstatement requests of Bloom and
Dwight.120
111. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 628.
112. Affidavit of Tim Dwight, Submitted with Plaintiffs Supplemental Citation of Authority,
Bloom v. NCAA, Case No.: 02CA2302 1, 2 (filed with Col. Ct. App., Apr. 3, 2004) (on file with
author).
113. Id. 6.
114. Hearing, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Jeremy Bloom).
115. Affidavit, supra note 112, 6, 8. Dwight was able to keep the endorsement monies he
received after successfully petitioning the NCAA for reinstatement to run track. Id.
116. All NCAA members, upon finding a violation of legislation regarding ethical conduct,
amateurism, recruiting, eligibility, financial aid, extra benefit and drug-testing, must declare the
offending athlete ineligible and the athlete must seek reinstatement through that athlete's
university. FAQ from the NCAA on Student-Athlete Reinstatement, http://wwwl.ncaa.ore/
membership/enforcement/s-areinstatement/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
117. Id.
118. Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (statement of Jeremy Bloom).
119. Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Statement Regarding Jeremy Bloom Reinstatement
Decision (Aug. 17, 2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/miscellaneous/ 2 004/
2004081701ms.htm.
120. Hearing, supra note 1, at 23.
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The Colorado appeals court could have determined that the
NCAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in selectively enforcing its
provision on endorsements against Bloom but not against Dwight had
it received this information in a timely way. At the very least, Bloom
should have prevailed in his subsequent request for reinstatement to
the NCAA. Not only did the NCAA conceal the facts about Dwight's
case from Bloom until it was too late, the NCAA also refused to follow
its own precedent-based approach in examining Bloom's reinstatement
case. The NCAA's justification for its different conclusions, that
Bloom willfully violated the endorsement provision while Dwight did
not, seems clearly inconsistent with Dwight's own version of events
and makes their treatment of Bloom arbitrary. 121
C. Failure to Analyze Reasonable Expectations of Both Parties
The Bloom court failed to analyze Bloom's reasonable
expectations in entering into the contract at issue in the case. While
the court stated that it would give effect to the reasonable
expectations of both parties by viewing the contract in its entirety, the
court focused solely on the NCAA's intent in enacting the bylaw 122 that
prohibits athletes from receiving endorsement money and making
media appearances. 23 An NCAA official stated that these provisions
had been applied consistently and in a non-sport specific manner. 24
Practical implications aside, the court failed to analyze Bloom's intent
at the time he signed his NLI, when he subjected himself to NCAA
regulations.
Courts must honor the reasonable expectations of all contract
parties and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of a contract.125
121. Since sending Bloom's lawyer the initial affidavit, Dwight sent Bloom's lawyer another
affidavit claiming that he had accepted the endorsement money while fully aware of the NCAA
rules that bar athletes from receiving endorsement money. Affidavit, supra note 112, 3. This
rebuts the NCAA's contention that Bloom's willful acceptance of endorsement money
distinguished the two cases.
122. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 12.5.2.1.
123. See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 625-26 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the NCAA
Bylaws express a clear intent to prohibit student-athletes from receiving endorsements without
regard to when the opportunity to receive them originated or whether the opportunity arose as a
result of a non-NCAA sport).
124. Id. at 626. This statement of consistent purpose seems ironic when considered alongside
the NCAA policy of allowing athletes to collect professional salaries, a practice that creates a
kind of discrimination against certain professional sports whose athletes are not paid salaries or
signing bonuses.
125. See, e.g., Rodman v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973)
(emphasis added) (quoting ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW - BASIC TEXT § 6.3 at 351 (1971)
(holding that "[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
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Thus, a court could refuse to apply even unambiguously stated
contract provisions if those provisions defeat the reasonable
expectations of one of the parties or a beneficiary such as Bloom. The
doctrine of reasonable expectations is applied generally to all contracts
of adhesion.126
The NCAA Constitution may be adhesive as applied to student-
athletes because athletes have no say in the provisions and
protections of their athletic contracts. 127 Additionally, the signing of
the NLI brings scholarship athletes under the NCAA's umbrella, a
scenario in which athletes seem to be at a bargaining disadvantage
when dealing with university officials who routinely engage in this
type of transaction.
The NCAA Constitution does not appear to be an adhesive
contract on its face. However, because athletes have little choice as to
whether to accept the NCAA Constitution's terms, courts should
analyze it under the rules that apply to a contract of adhesion. The
Bloom court purported to do this by analyzing reasonable expectations
but again, only analyzed the NCAA's expectations.
Instead of ignoring Bloom's reasonable expectations, the court
in Bloom should have evaluated what Bloom's actual expectations
were when he entered into the contract with Colorado and the NCAA.
In Bloom's situation, it is unclear what these expectations were when
he signed his letter of intent (although he has intimated that he knew
of the endorsement provisions between the time he signed his
scholarship and the time he enrolled).' 28 Consequently, had the court
decided that Bloom did not think that becoming a college athlete
would require him to sacrifice his ability to pursue his career as a
freestyle skier, the court's holding on the breach of contract claim may
have been different.
D. Confusion about the Legal Standard to Apply
During Bloom's appeal, the Colorado court of appeals judge
appeared unclear as to what standard of review to apply to the third-
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the
policy provision would have negated those expectations").
126. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975)
(positing that the rules of normal contract law cannot be 'mechanically applied"' to adhesion
contracts). Contracts are adhesive when some degree of imbalance of bargaining power exists
between the parties and the contract is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Neal v. State Farm
Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
127. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (demonstrating that student athletes
have no voice in adopting the rules and regulations to which they are subject).
128. Hearing, supra note 1, at 42.
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party beneficiary claim. Bloom's lawyer stated that the appellate
judge asked three different times at oral argument whether the
arbitrary and capricious standard "was part of the contract claim."
129
In response, both Bloom's lawyer and the NCAA counsel told the judge
that these issues were separate and independent. 130 This suggests
that the Colorado appeals judge may have mistakenly applied the
association law standard of review (arbitrary and capricious) to an
independent contract claim.
Furthermore, while the Bloom court found that student-
athletes are third-party beneficiaries, it concluded that Bloom's
standing as a third-party beneficiary merited the same vague
contractual analysis based on implied duties that courts had applied
in cases such as Ross.' 3' This level of scrutiny seems inappropriate
since these earlier courts applied this good faith analysis only when
athletes failed to allege a breach of material obligations. 32 Because
Bloom alleged such a breach, the court's good faith analysis seems
misplaced.
E. Aftermath of Bloom: Standing and Material Obligations
Third-party beneficiary status appears to be a boon for
wronged student-athletes who bring claims against the NCAA. Under
the logic of Bloom, student-athletes may now have standing to sue the
NCAA and can point to material obligations that the NCAA and its
institutions owe student-athletes. Before courts recognized this third-
party beneficiary status, student-athletes lacked independent
standing and had to rely on their institutions to bring claims against
the NCAA.' 33 Granting standing to student-athletes as third-party
beneficiaries recognizes the mismatch between the interests of the
institution and student-athletes due to the amount of money at stake
129. E-mail from Peter Rush, Member, Bell, Boyd and Lloyd LLC, to Author (Jan. 15, 2005,
07:01:22 CST) (on file with author).
130. Id.
131. See id. (claiming that Bloom's claim of arbitrary and capricious action asserted a
violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing).
132. See supra notes 92-94, 97-100 and accompanying text (describing cases in which courts
applied the good faith analysis).
133. Because the institution and the NCAA are the parties to the NCAA Constitution, under
the traditional common-law privity rule, student-athletes could not sue on this contract because
they lacked privity. 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:1 (Jack K. Levin ed.,
4th ed. 2000).
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and the ongoing nature of the institution's relationship with the
NCAA. 134
The third-party beneficiary rule dispenses with contract law's
traditional privity requirement by allowing an individual who is not a
party to the contract to nonetheless enforce its terms.135 Under the
third-party beneficiary rule, third parties can enforce the contract to
the same degree as a traditional party in privity if they are the
intended beneficiaries 136 because the promisor has a duty to any
intended beneficiaries to perform the promise. 37 Thus, when an
intended beneficiary has an enforceable claim against the promisee,
the beneficiary can obtain a judgment from the promisor or promisee
or both depending on their duties to him.138 To be liable, the promisee
in the third-party agreement must be responsible for the breach,
jointly or individually. 139 However, in most cases, the third-party
beneficiary's action lies solely against the promisor. 140
Before Bloom, because the NLI does not identify obligations
that the NCAA and member schools owe student-athletes, those who
challenged NCAA rules had to argue that the NCAA or its member
institution violated an implied duty of fairness. However, the grant of
contractual status amounted to a hollow pronouncement because
courts made it difficult to prove breaches egregious enough to violate
these vague, implied duties in the scholarship contract. 41  Post-
Bloom, courts faced with student-athlete challenges to NCAA rules
and actions should look to the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws to
identify the material obligations the NCAA and its member
institutions owe to student-athletes.
These material obligations make the athlete's overall burden of
proof lighter. While the member institution, as promisor, is more
likely to be liable in these situations, a court could hold that the
NCAA, even as a promisee, is liable for a misapplication of one of its
134. For instance, the NCAA was investigating the University of Colorado football team for
alleged recruiting violations at the time of Bloom's court appeal and final appeal to the NCAA.
Rick Morrissey, Odd As It Sounds, Barnett Will Be Back, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 2005, at C1. This
makes it more likely that Colorado did not press Bloom's case as hard as it normally would have
in an attempt to mitigate future penalties incurred for these unrelated recruiting violations.
135. 13 RICHARD A. LORD, 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37:1 (Jack K. Levin ed., 4th ed.
2000).
136. Id.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
138. Id. § 310.
139. Noel v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 805 P.2d 1244, 1251 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
140. District of Columbia v. Campbell, 580 A.2d 1295, 1302 (D.C. 1990).
141. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (describing cases in which the NCAA was
held not to have breached duties in scholarship contracts).
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eligibility rules or a failure to adequately oversee its coaches. Because
the NCAA Constitution extensively regulates coaches, student-
athletes can argue that coaches and other officials act as the agents of
not only member institutions, but the NCAA as well. 142 The NCAA
regulations of coaches would make the NCAA a promisee, jointly liable
for a breach of contract.
The following sub-sections detail the stories of Devaughn
Darling, Neil Reed, and Sammy Maldonado as case studies of the
types of athletes who could bring claims against the NCAA and
possibly prevail on these claims post-Bloom. These examples are
meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive, by showing the practical
application of the third-party beneficiary rule to student-athletes.
1. NCAA Constitutional Provisions for Health of Student-Athletes
Though the NCAA's amateurism goals are a far cry from the
reality of big-time college sports, the provisions relating to student-
athlete welfare seem to stray even further from the standard
operating procedure of NCAA Division I schools. The NCAA charges
its members with the duty of running their athletic departments in a
way that protects and increases the "physical and educational welfare
of student-athletes."143  Additionally, institutions must protect the
physical health of their student-athletes by providing them with a safe
environment. 144
a. Examples of a Breach of Material Obligations
In February 2001, Devaughn Darling, a linebacker for the
Florida State University football team, died as a result of an off-
season workout. 145 The Florida State football team's training rules
provided that coaches should not allow players to drink water during
the workouts which were known as some of the most grueling in
college football. 146 An observer of the first day of these off-season
workouts wrote that it was "chilling" to hear a Florida State assistant
coach tell the athletes, "You will pass out before you die. If you pass
142. See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 11.1.2 (stating that staff members found in
violation of NCAA regulations will be subject to discipline set forth in the enforcement
procedures); id. art. 11.1.2.1 (holding the coach responsible for promoting an atmosphere of
compliance and monitoring that compliance within his/her program).
143. Id. art. 2.2.
144. Id. art. 2.2.3.
145. Gary Smith, Soul Survivor, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 2, 2002, at 66.
146. Id. at 70. Darling had the sickle cell trait, and sickle-shaped red blood cells, which
threaten the flow of oxygen in the blood, were found throughout his body. Id.
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out, the trainers will take care.of you!"'1 47 Darling's family settled the
wrongful death lawsuit it brought against Florida State for $2
million. 148 As a result of the Darling case, Florida State now allows
water breaks during its workouts and has an ambulance and
defibrillator on site. 149 Florida State University arguably breached its
duty to provide athletes a safe environment by putting its athletes
through such dangerous workouts. Though Darling's family won a
settlement against Florida State for this incident, under the reasoning
of Bloom, they could have added breach of contract claims against the
NCAA and Florida State to the existing tort claim because Darling
was a third-party beneficiary to the contract with the NCAA.
Another instance of jeopardizing student-athlete safety
occurred when Bob Knight, at the time the head basketball coach at
Indiana University, choked Neil Reed, the starting point guard,
during a 1997 practice. 150 As a third-party beneficiary, Reed could
have argued that pursuant to its duty to provide a safe environment,
the NCAA and Indiana were obligated to keep him free from physical
attacks outside of those naturally present in the game of basketball.
Knight's attack on Reed violated this obligation. Consequently, Reed
may have been able to collect from the NCAA and Indiana University
for their failure to provide him the requisite safe environment in
which to play basketball.
Any time a coach or trainer asks a player to play while hurt or
risk further injury, that athlete could allege a breach of the duty to
provide a safe environment. Athletes whose injuries are exacerbated
while playing hurt could argue that they were compelled to play
because of the control the member university and coach have over
their future education.151 As a result of this compulsion by university
staff members, athletes may be able to prove that the NCAA failed to
provide a safe environment.
2. NCAA Constitutional Provisions for Academic Welfare
The NCAA requires that in order to compete, an athlete must
be in "good academic standing" as determined by the institution. 5 2 It
147. Id.
148. Eddie Timanus, Fla. State, Darling Family Settle Suit for $2M, USA TODAY, June 29,
2004, at C03.
149. Smith, supra note 145, at 75.
150. Jack Thompson, Tape Shows Knight Grabbing Player's Neck, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 2000,
at 2 (detailing video tape showing Knight grabbing Reid's neck and "pushing it back").
151. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting the institution's ability to take away
an athletic scholarship for failure to follow directions or failure to participate).
152. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 14.01.2.1.
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also puts forth a series of complicated degree completion requirements
that institutions must enforce. 153 Each member institution bears the
responsibility for establishing and maintaining an environment where
the student-athlete's athletic activities are an integral part of the
educational experience. 154 Specifically, this means "[t]he admission,
academic standing and academic progress of student-athletes shall be
consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the institution
for the student body in general."1 55
a. Example of Breach of Material Obligations
Sammy Maldonado, a running back at Ohio State University,
wanted to transfer to Maryland after his second season but had only
earned seventeen transferable credits in his two years at Ohio
State. 56 Maldonado had taken the equivalent of forty credit hours at
Ohio State and only failed to get a passing grade in six of those credit
hours. 157 However, he received four credits for playing football, three
credits for Ohio State coach Jim Tressel's "Coaching Football" class,
and three credits for a class called "Issues Affecting Student-
Athletes."'158 Because of these and other "filler" credits that Maryland
refused to accept due to their lack of academic rigor, Maldonado was
forced to pass forty-three credit hours in one calendar year to become
eligible at Maryland, which he did.' 59 These facts call into question
the legitimacy of Maldonado's education at Ohio State and the worth
of the degree that Maldonado would have received had he stayed at
Ohio State. Maldonado explained, "Over there [at Ohio State], they
just put you in classes .... I let them take care of my schedule."' 60
Additionally, while many schools award credit to varsity athletes for
playing their sports, as allowed by the NCAA,' 6l the number of "filler"
classes that Maldonado took seems to overstep Ohio State's
prerogatives in this area.
153. Id. art. 14.4.
154. Id. art. 2.2.1 (adopted 1/10/95).
155. Id. art. 2.5.
156. Ryan Hockensmith, Extra Credit, http://sports.espn.go.comlncf/news/story?id=1919255
(last visited Apr. 30, 2006).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Mark Schlabach, Varsity Athletes Get Class Credit, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at Al.
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3. Evidentiary Issues Regarding Proving the Breach
The analysis of whether a university failed to provide either an
adequate education or a safe environment under the NCAA contract
would be a fact-specific inquiry. 162 To prove that a university did not
provide a safe environment, a student-athlete would face a high
burden of proof and would need to show facts similar to the Darling
and Reed stories. Statements made by coaches expressing an utter
disregard for student-athlete welfare and the lack of reasonable safety
accommodations, like water breaks, would be essential in showing a
lack of concern for the athletes. Further, courts may refuse to allow
the introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures like the
presence of emergency vehicles and defibrillators after Darling died,
since the Federal Rules of Evidence block admission of this evidence in
order to encourage socially responsible behavior.163 Student-athletes
may also have trouble establishing the standard for a safe
environment. As the examples above indicate, student-athletes may
only be able to prove what constitutes a safe environment by showing
what clearly does not amount to such an environment.
As to the evidentiary proof necessary to show that a school
breached its material, academic obligations under the NCAA contract,
courts should not overlook the student-athlete's responsibility for his
or her own education. Student-athletes must be accountable as they,
too, are a part of the educational process. Even though universities
filter some student-athletes like Maldonado into classes that may not
contribute meaningfully to the educational experience, athletes must
take control of their own educations. However, in Maldonado's
situation he had little actual control over his schedule, so the athlete's
responsibility would seem to diminish in importance as the
university's responsibility increases. In arguing that a school
breached its academic obligations, additional factors could include: the
number of absences occasioned by athletic commitments; a record of
complaints by the student or a representative; and evidence of passing
grades in courses never attended.164
Courts, while hesitant to determine whether an educational
experience is legally adequate, have found that material educational
obligations prompt a searching review. 165  A situation like
Maldonado's, for example, may trigger close judicial scrutiny because
162. See Johnson, supra note 61, at 121 (noting that the academic breach claim would be
include a fact-specific inquiry).
163. FED. R. EVID. 407.
164. Johnson, supra note 61, at 121.
165. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing Ross case).
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Ohio State seemingly breached its material obligation to give him an
educational experience on par with the rest of the student body.
However, courts have been unwilling to recognize the validity of
educational malpractice claims for policy and evidentiary reasons; 166
thus, courts may dismiss many of these third-party claims.
Regardless of the likelihood of success, institutions such as Ohio State
should not be allowed to wring out every drop of athletic skill from
their athletes without providing an educational experience that allows
these athletes to transfer or to graduate with a legitimate degree.
4. Remedies
Student-athletes who prove that the NCAA breached a
material obligation of its contract with the student-athletes must show
monetary damages in order to recover. In the case of a breach of the
duty to provide an education "consistent with the policies and
standards adopted by the institution for the student body in
general,"'167 it may be difficult to prove quantifiable damages. A court
will limit damages to those within the contemplation of the breaching
party at the time of the contract's formation. 168 In this case, student-
athletes could claim that they were denied the opportunity for future
earnings reasonably expected if they had received a "meaningful
education."' 69 The NCAA and its member institutions would have
difficulty claiming that it was not within their contemplation that
providing a substandard education could bring about these damages.
Some courts have been open to punitive damages when a university
knowingly breaches such an educational duty. 170 However, other
courts have found this approach too speculative and have even refused
to permit recovery for lost earnings.' 7'
College athletes may also attempt to show restitutionary
damages by asserting that if an institution retained the benefit of the
student-athlete's services even though the institution did not provide
the education owed, this would constitute unjust enrichment. 72 This
166. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of such a claim in
Ross case).
167. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing universities' responsibilities
towards their student athletes).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981).
169. See supra note 92 (explaining that Creighton's pledge to Ross to provide him with a
"meaningful education" was essential in the court's holding that Creighton was liable for failing
to provide this).
170. Johnson, supra note 61, at 119.
171. Id. at 120.
172. Id. at 119.
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option would be available only for star athletes in big-time sports who
have the ability to "single-handedly 0 alter the fortunes of a given
athletic program." 173 As a result, most athletes could not easily make
this showing.
An athlete able to prove a breach of the NCAA provision to
provide for a safe environment for athletes would have a less difficult
time showing damages than an athlete trying to prove damages for a
breach of academic promises. Both economic damages (such as
hospital expenses) and non-economic damages (such as pain and
suffering) would be available to the student-athlete injured as a result
of the institution's failure to provide a safe environment. Courts are
accustomed to awarding such damages as these are the typical awards
in tort cases. As a result, courts will more likely grant such awards
than grant damages for educational malpractice, a tort unrecognized
by most courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The determination that athletes are third-party beneficiaries to
the contract with the NCAA may signal a turning point in the way
courts look at the relationship between student-athletes, colleges, and
the NCAA. Jeremy Bloom's case received significant exposure in the
media because of the perceived inequities present in his situation.
While professional baseball players who moonlight as college athletes
in other sports may play baseball for compensation in the off-season,
Bloom was forced to choose between two sports he loves because he
chose the wrong professional sport.
The NCAA's decision not to reinstate Bloom, along with other
eligibility decisions made around the same time, 174 caused an uproar
in the public and on Capitol Hill.175 To minimize bad publicity, the
NCAA does not want an individual like Jeremy Bloom to tell his story.
Congressman Spencer Bachus, presiding over a House subcommittee
oversight hearing that included testimony from Bloom, said, "The
NCAA made several calls about Mr. Bloom asking that he not testify.
I tell you, it just proves my case that we need a little openness and
sunshine in these hearings .... -176
173. Id.
174. See Woody, supra note 3 (detailing the seeming inequities in Bloom's case and that of
Mike Williams, a receiver for the University of Southern California, whose reinstatement request
was also denied by the NCAA).
175. See generally Hearing, supra note 1.
176. Hearing, supra note 1, at 107.
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The many rights guaranteed by the NCAA Constitution
(including the right to a safe environment and the right to an
education commensurate to that offered to other students) could now
be the subject of cognizable claims if student-athletes can clear the
necessary evidentiary hurdles. If courts faithfully apply contractual
principles to contract claims brought by these student-athletes
(something the Bloom court failed to do), student-athletes may have a
new avenue of redress against both universities and the NCAA. This
recognition is long overdue as these big-time "amateur" athletes make
large sums of money for their schools and the decisions of athletic
department staff and school officials are increasingly conflicted.
Bloom should signal the advent of greater scrutiny on NCAA and
institutional actions that affect student-athlete welfare and will
hopefully lead to more oversight of the NCAA and its member
institutions.
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